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Introduction 
The role of stakeholders in fostering the greening of business1 has received 
substantial attention over the last decade.  Among those stakeholders, consumers are 
of particular interest.  In one of the first publications by the Greening of Industry 
Network, scholars reported that managers saw the consumer as the most powerful 
future driving force behind the greening of business (Fischer and Schot 1993).  Such 
“consumer power” is easily conceivable since business cannot survive without 
customers.  If consumers decided to switch from environmentally inferior to 
environmentally superior goods, they would give strong incentives to business to 
comply with their environmental preferences.  To date, however, consumers have 
shown limited willingness to send strong signals to business that environmental 
superiority will be rewarded.   
From the perspective of the policy maker, this lack of environmental 
consumerism2 is unfortunate.  Given the continuing scarcity of resources in the public 
sector and current antagonism to a large state especially in Western societies, the 
consumer can only be a most welcome influence on the environmental performance of 
business.  In terms of economic and political considerations, the reliance on the 
consumer to provide economic incentives to business rather than on the government 
to impose top-down regulation provides higher degrees of economic efficiency and 
political acceptability.3  For the policy maker, therefore, a bigger role of consumers in 
influencing the greening of business and products would be desirable.4 
This paper explores the question how the willingness and capacity of 
consumers to play a bigger role in improving the environmental performance of 
business can be enhanced.  Specifically, the paper analyzes the selection of policy 
instruments to increase environmentally superior consumption choices by consumers.5  
                                                 
1
 The greening of business is broadly defined as environmental improvements in products and 
processes.  
2
 Environmental consumerism is used as a short for the inclination of consumers to make 
environmentally superior consumption decisions. 
3
 In terms of the ethical perspective of liberalism, the reliance on economic incentives creates an 
opportunity to provide consumers with their “rightful” role in influencing the environmental 
performance of their “economic contractors.” 
4
 The same argument and therefore to a considerable extent this analysis applies to the role of the 
consumer in influencing the social performance of business. 
5
 The emphasis is on instrument choice rather than instrument performance.  The literature on the 
political economy of public policy has taught us that the policy process does not necessarily lead to the 
choice of the most effective instrument. Ligteringen (1998) also demonstrates that many policy 
measures that can be derived for steering consumer behavior with respect to the environment that are 
both effective and implementable, but highlights that these qualities do not necessarily guarantee their 
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In pursuit of this objective, the paper utilizes the policy instrument model as a 
theoretical foundation.  The model allows the identification of characteristics of 
policy instruments likely to be selected in the policy process on the basis of policy 
network characteristics, specifically interconnectedness and cohesion.  
Interconnectedness in this context “refers both to the contacts in the relevant policy 
formation process... and also the relationships between the actors outside the actual 
policy process at any particular time (Bressers and O’Toole 1998, p.219).  Cohesion 
refers to the distribution of objectives among actors in the network.  Accordingly, the 
paper assesses cohesion and interconnectedness with respect to the interaction 
between policy makers and consumers.   
With respect to the policy maker-consumer dimension, the analysis finds that 
the interconnectedness between policy maker and consumers is uniformly weak.  
Cohesion in the policy network can range from relatively strong to relatively weak 
cohesion, depending on the ability of environmentally superior consumption choices 
to satisfy consumer needs and the costs associated with such choices.  Based on this 
analysis, the paper illustrates that under conditions of strong cohesion in the network 
the provision of information to consumers is a likely policy instrument.  Under 
conditions of weak cohesion, however, the policy maker is likely to choose more 
interventionists instruments such as eco-taxes or environmental housing standards, for 
instance.   
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section I introduces the policy instrument 
model.  Section II applies the model to environmental consumerism by identifying 
network characteristics and deriving the characteristics of feasible policy instruments.  
Section III discusses the likelihood of strong cohesion in the policy maker – consumer 
network.  The paper concludes with a summary of the findings and a discussion of 
their implications.   
 
I. The Policy Instrument Model 
 To embed the discussion of policy instruments to enhance environmental 
consumerism in a theoretical context, this paper draws on the policy instrument model 
(Bressers 1993, 1995, Bressers and Ligteringen 1998, Bressers and O’Toole 1998).  
This model derives the characteristics of policy instruments likely to be chosen in the 
                                                                                                                                            
career as policy instruments. Therefore, instrument choice has to be explored before the performance of 
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policy process from policy network characteristics, specifically interconnectedness 
and cohesion.6  Combinations of weak and strong interconnectedness and weak and 
strong cohesion allow the creation of four “types” of networks.  Furthermore, Bressers 
and his colleagues identify six dominant characteristics of policy instruments7:  
 
1) normative appeal to the target group 
2) proportionality of the policy maker’s response to target group behavior 
3) provision or withdrawal of resources to or from the target group 
4) target group’s freedom to opt for or against application 
5) the reliance on bilateral or multilateral arrangements 
6) the role of the policy-maker during the policy implementation phase 
 
The policy instrumentation model links these policy instrument characteristics to the 
policy network characteristics identified above in order to develop a model of policy 
instrument choice:   
 
 Strong interconnectedness Weak interconnectedness 
Strong cohesion No normative appeal 
Proportionality 
Provision of resources 
Freedom to opt for/against 
application 
Bilateral/multilateral arrangements 
Implementation by policy makers or 
closely affiliated organizations 
No normative appeal 
Proportionality 
Provision of resources 
Considerable freedom to opt 
for/against application 
Absence of bilateral arrangements 
Implementation by policy makers or 
intermediary organizations 
Weak cohesion Normative appeal 
Proportionality 
Limited withdrawal of resources 
Absence of freedom for target group 
Many bi- or multilateral 
arrangements 
Implementation by policy makers or 
affiliated organizations 
Normative appeal 
Absence of proportionality 
Withdrawal of resources 
Limited freedom to opt for/against 
application 
Absence of bilateral arrangements 
Involvement of parties other than 
policy makers 




                                                                                                                                            
the chosen instrument can be estimated.   
6
 The link between policy network characteristics and the choice of policy instruments is based on the 
argument that policy networks try to reproduce themselves: “the more an instrument’s characteristics 
help to maintain the existing features of the network, the more likely it is to be selected during the 
policy formation process” (Bressers and O’Toole 1998, p. 220). 
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The policy instrument model in its original version and applications 
(Ligteringen 1998) considers only one target group when studying policy networks.  
In this case as in many other policy issues, however, two or more target groups are 
involved.  The policy network of enhancing consumer willingness and capacity to 
positively influence the environmental performance of business includes both 
consumers and business.  Interconnectedness and cohesion in the policy network thus 
has to be determined between the policy maker, consumers and industry. 
As pointed out above, the policy instrument model, in its current form, only 
provides a framework for two-dimensional analysis not three dimensional analysis.  
Therefore, this paper will conduct a simplified assessment of the environmental 
consumerism policy network in two two-dimensional cuts.  In a first analysis, the 
paper will explore interconnectedness and cohesion with respect to the interaction 
between policy maker and consumers.  In a second analysis, the paper will consider 
the interaction between policy maker and business. 
Such an analysis is incomplete, of course.  It cannot take the impact of actors 
across the two-dimensional cuts and their influence on policy design into account.  
The paper will attempt to overcome this weakness by taking such cross-cutting 
influences informally into account when analyzing the two-dimensional interactions.  
Eventually, of course, the policy instrument model will require further development to 
provide a theoretical framework for the analysis of policy networks with two or more 
target groups.   
 
II. Policy Makers and Consumers 
Applying the policy instrumentation model to the present topic involves, as a 
first step, the characterization of the relevant policy network.  Characterizing the 
network dimension policy maker – consumers in terms of interconnectedness and 
cohesion yields the following results.  The degree of interconnectedness is uniformly 
weak, because of the low level of accessibility of millions of consumers as a target 
group.8  Policy makers cannot have repeated direct contact will consumers as a target 
group during the policy formation process or even outside of it.  Consumer 
                                                                                                                                            
7
 The authors argue convincingly against the conventional differentiation between instrument types in 
terms of “incentive based” versus command-and-control, as most instruments combine characteristics 
of different types.   
8
 See also Ligteringen (1998) who conducts a similar analysis of the accessibility of consumers as a 
target group for the policy issue of sustainable consumption. 
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representatives have this contact with the policy maker, of course, but even they lack 
direct and comprehensive contact with consumers.  Interconnectedness, therefore, is 
weak. 
Cohesion, on the other side, can range from weak to strong degrees as a 
comparison of the goals of policy makers and consumers indicates.  The goal of 
policy makers assumed for this analysis is to increase purchases of environmentally 
superior products versus environmentally inferior ones and thereby use consumer 
demand to improve the environmental performance of business.9  The goal of 
consumers is to satisfy their needs at the lowest possible costs.  As the following 
discussion illustrates, the extent to which these goal converge or diverge is context 
dependent. 
The consumers’ goals will be compatible with the policy-maker’s goal if 
purchases of environmentally superior products allow consumers to satisfy their needs 
better at lower or similar costs, or similarly at lower costs compared to 
environmentally inferior goods.  The goals will still be compatible, if purchases of 
environmentally superior products allow consumers to satisfy their needs to a similar 
extent at similar costs.  The goals will diverge, however, if environmentally superior 
consumption choices mean a lesser satisfaction of needs at similar costs, a similar 
satisfaction of needs at higher costs, and especially if they mean a lesser satisfaction 
of needs at higher costs.  Goal convergence thus depends on the extent to which 
purchases of environmentally superior goods satisfy the needs of consumers and on 
the costs associated with those purchases.  The following figure illustrates the range 
of cohesion likely to exist in the policy network.10 
 
                                                 
9
 This strategy would also reduce the overall environmental impact of consumption, of course, which in 
itself can be a policy goal.  The focus of this paper, however, is on the role of consumers in fostering 
the greening of business. 
10
 Bressers and O’Toole view cohesion more as a consensus pertaining to deeper issues such as shared 
values and a shared world-view rather than as goal convergence in specific instances.  This paper, in 
contrast, assumes that it is a combination of the two that determines policy instrument choice.  Both the 
extent to which the network is characterized by shared fundamental values and the extent to which 













Figure 2:  Cohesion between Policy-Makers and Consumers
 
The figure depicts the likelihood that consumers will make environmentally 
superior consumption choices (axis Z) as dependent on the extent to which 
environmentally superior products satisfy their needs compared to environmentally 
inferior products (axis X) and the costs associated with environmentally superior 
consumption choices (axis Y).  Notice that the X and Y axes represent the satisfaction 
of needs and the costs of environmentally superior consumption choices relative to 
environmentally inferior consumption choices.  High values on both axes indicate that 
the environmentally superior product satisfies needs better and its costs are higher.  
Medium values mean that the two products are equal on both dimensions, while low 
values indicate a lesser satisfaction of needs and lower costs. 
As the figure indicates, at the left extreme, where costs of environmentally 
superior consumption choices are higher than those of environmentally inferior ones 
and needs satisfaction is lower, the consumer is extremely unlikely to make 
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environmentally superior consumption choices.  Even if needs satisfaction is similar 
at higher costs or lower at similar costs, the likelihood that the consumer will make 
the environmentally superior consumption choice is still low.  The other extreme 
depicts situations in which environmentally superior consumption choices lead to 
higher needs satisfaction at lower costs.  As a consequence, the consumer is likely to 
choose the environmentally superior products almost in every instant.  Even when 
moving slightly to the left, i.e. if needs satisfaction is higher at similar costs, or needs 
satisfaction is similar at lower costs, the consumer will still make environmentally 
superior consumption choices most of the time.  In general, the slant of the plane 
illustrates that the consumer is the more likely to make the environmentally superior 
consumption choice, the better the needs satisfaction and the lower the costs 
compared to the environmentally inferior consumption choice.  The plane is slightly 
raised above the “floor” of the figure because some degree of cohesion will always 
exist in the policy network, as in most cases consumers are aware that, in principle, an 
environmentally superior consumption choice would be better. 
If we recall that the goal of the policy maker assumed for this analysis is that 
consumers make environmentally superior consumption choices (i.e. generally high 
values on the Z axis), the figure illustrates the degree of cohesion in terms of the 
vertical distance between the plane and the “ceiling” of the figure.  Where the plane 
reaches or approaches this “ceiling,” cohesion is strong, while a large distance 
between plane and “ceiling” indicates goal divergence. 
 
Policy Instruments 
The above discussion highlights that network cohesion with respect to 
environmental consumerism can range from strong to relatively weak values.  Recall 
that the analysis had earlier determined that the network is also characterized by weak 
interconnectedness.  The policy instrumentation model suggests that instruments with 
different characteristics are likely to be chosen in these two cases (see Figure 3).  In 
practice, the characteristics of feasible policy instruments are likely to range from one 
extreme to the other, with specific choices exhibiting relatively more of those 
characteristics fitting the particular network characteristics in terms of cohesion.   
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Weak        Strong  
Cohesion        Cohesion 
• Normative appeal      • No normative appeal 
• Proportionality      • Absence of Proportionality 
• Withdrawal of resources     • Provision of Resources 
• Limited choice to opt for or against    • Choice to opt for or against 






























Figure 3:  Instrument Characteristics for Strong and Weak Cohesion 
Goal 
Convergence 
In the case of a combination of weak interconnectedness with strong cohesion, the 
selected policy instrument is likely to have the following characteristics11: 
                                                 
11
 The present discussion limits itself to three of the six characteristics of policy instruments identified 
by Bressers and O’Toole, as previous research has already pointed out that the model is potentially 
overspecified (Ligteringen 1998, for an argument for justification of the simplification of complex 
typologies under some circumstances see Scharpf 1989).  Thus, the present analysis focuses on the 
specified core set of instrument characteristics, which are likely to cover most of the variance in policy 
instrument characteristics in this policy network. 
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• lack normative appeal 
• provide for a proportional response 
• provide additional resources to consumers 
• provide considerable freedom to consumers to opt for or against the application of 
that policy instrument 
 
Again, weak interconnectedness and strong cohesion exist in the environmental 
consumerism network if environmentally superior consumption choices satisfy 
consumer needs better and at lower costs than environmentally inferior ones.  In this 
case, no normative appeal is necessary, since the consumer, basically, prefers the 
same outcome as the policy maker.  In fact, normative appeal could even hurt the 
objective of the policy maker as mandatory regulations could be perceived as 
unnecessarily interventionist and thereby undermine the cohesion in the policy 
network (Bressers and O’Toole 1998).  Furthermore, policy makers are likely to 
provide resources to the consumer rather than withdraw them, since they are likely to 
be positively inclined to consumers’ aims and therefore would choose to influence 
behavior by rewarding rather than penalizing (ibid.).  Finally, the policy maker is 
likely to leave consumers considerable freedom in terms of the application of the 
policy instrument because the objectives of the target group are already similar to 
those of the policy maker.  Again, mandatory enforcement could be perceived as 
unnecessarily heavy-handed and thereby undermine cohesion in the network.12 
Alternatively, in cases in which weak interconnectedness is combined with strong 
cohesion, the policy instrumentation model suggests that the selected policy 
instrument would have the following characteristics: 
• normative appeal 
• lack of proportionality 
• withdrawal of resources from the target group 
• only limited ability on the part of consumers to opt for or against the application 
of the policy instrument 
 
                                                 
12
 Furthermore, as recent research in the discipline of sociology highlights (Horne 1999), increasing the 
intervention of government in the creation and enforcement of rules and norms often leads to less 
willingness of individuals to participate in such “governance.” 
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Weak cohesion exists in the policy network, if environmentally superior 
consumption choices are associated with higher costs and a lower satisfaction of 
needs.  Under these conditions, the consumer is extremely unlikely to choose 
environmentally superior products out of her own desire.  In consequence, as Bressers 
and his colleagues suggest, a normative appeal is necessary to induce consumers to 
make the desired consumption choices.  This normative appeal can be provided in the 
form of regulations or persuasive public information on environmental necessities, for 
instance.  Furthermore, the policy maker is likely to choose an instrument that 
withdraws resources from the target group for non-compliance with the policy 
maker’s preferences, i.e. penalizes undesirable consumption choices.  Finally, 
consumers will have only a very limited ability to influence the application of the 
policy instrument.  In contrast to conditions of strong cohesion, a policy instrument 
under conditions of weak cohesion, thus, is likely to be much more interventionist in 
nature.  
An example of a policy instrument to enhance environmental consumerism 
fitting conditions of strong cohesion is the provision of environmental information.13  
This could be in the form of general background information on environmental 
consequences of particular consumption choices, or on the environmental implications 
of the environmental characteristics of specific products.  Having better information 
on the environmental implications of consumption choices has the potential to greatly 
enhance the ability of consumers to voice environmental preferences through the 
market place.  Such information has to be easily accessible, and to be perceived as 
sufficiently comprehensive and accurate, so that it allows consumers to accomplish 
their goal at relatively low costs.  Information that is not easily accessible raises the 
costs of environmentally superior choices, of course.   
                                                 
13
 While the provision of information on environmental product or producer characteristics is a 
promising policy instrument, the task to provide comprehensive and accurate information that is easily 
accessible at the same time should not be underestimated.  The identification of the relevant indicators, 
the gathering of the information, the monitoring and enforcement of requirements regarding its 
accuracy require substantial institutional investments, especially in a global economy.  Furthermore, 
the provision of information on the environmental characteristics of products is not just a question of 
its presence or absence of that information.  The manner of provision, its accessibility both in terms of 
location and comprehension, its aggregation of environmental indicators without loss of 
meaningfulness, its simplicity without creation of cynicism all require careful design of the information 
“provider,” be it an eco-label or other mechanism.  In addition, the current regulation of the 
international economic system, personified in the WTO, places limits on the information that 
governments can require from producers.  These limits would need to be challenged or carefully 
circumvented.  Still, the information strategy is the easiest and in the short-term most promising one of 
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Information on environmental implications of consumption choices fits the 
characteristics described by the policy instrument model for the identified network 
characteristics well.  Such information does not involve a strict normative appeal in 
terms of legal and illegal choices, although, of course, an evaluation of superior and 
inferior choices at least from an environmental perspective would be present.14  In 
addition, consumers would have a choice whether they would utilize the provided 
information or not.  The information on the environmental implications of 
consumption choices provides consumers with the additional resources necessary to 
make the desired choice.  Finally, the content of the information reflects the principle 
of proportionality.  The political benefit of the information strategy results from its 
lack of intrusiveness.  Providing the consumer with relevant information ensures the 
principle of consumer sovereignty held in high esteem by liberals.  
Another example for a policy instrument exhibiting feasible characteristics for 
conditions of strong cohesion is provided by subsidies for environmentally superior 
consumption choices.  The intention behind these subsidies is to reduce the financial 
disadvantage of the environmentally superior consumption choice, of course.15  Such 
subsidies could exist in the form of tax reductions like those applied to the purchase 
of green electricity in the Netherlands, for instance, or the purchase of “clean” 
automobiles in Germany.  Subsidies for environmentally superior consumption 
choices would lack a strict normative appeal, be based on proportionality, and 
provide consumers with additional resources.  Freedom to opt for or against 
application of this policy instrument would only be given under certain instances, 
however.  Such freedom would exist if consumers can decide to claim the tax 
reduction on their annual tax return, but not if the subsidy is automatically applied. 
Moving from strong to relatively weaker cohesion in the policy network, a 
policy instrument likely to be chosen are eco-taxes.  Their regulative nature involves a 
normative appeal but also proportionality.  The higher costs of environmentally 
undesirable products withdraw resources from consumers who do not want to follow 
the policy objective.  At the same time, eco-taxes if combined with a tax shift provide 
resources to consumers who do follow the policy objective and purchase the 
                                                                                                                                            
the strategies available to reduce the collective action problems associated with environmental 
consumerism. 
14
 Not heavy handed, because of potential backlash? 
15
 Reducing subsidies for environmentally inferior consumption choices would accomplish a similar 
objective, of course. 
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environmentally superior product.  Consumers do not have a choice regarding the 
application of eco-taxes, but they can avoid paying higher taxes by purchasing 
environmentally friendlier products.  Compared to the provision of information 
discussed above, eco-taxes are an instrument that makes environmental consumerism 
much more government driven.  Still, by leaving consumers considerable freedom of 
choice regarding the environmental characteristics of their consumption choices, they 
are much less interventionist in nature than prohibitions. 
A slightly different form of eco-taxes are charges on environmentally inferior 
consumption choices.  Such charges can be imposed in the form of taxes without the 
design of a general eco-tax structure.  Charges on environmentally inferior 
consumption choices also “punish” behavior through the withdrawal of resources, 
often allow for a proportional response by the policy maker, and involve a 
normative appeal and lack freedom to opt for or against the application of the 
instrument as they have to be paid.  
There is only very limited room for the use of policy instruments which are 
likely to be chosen under conditions of extremely weak cohesion in this analysis.  
This is partly due to the way the question analyzed here is posed.  After all, the 
assumed goal of the policy maker is to enhance the role of the consumer/market in 
influencing the environmental performance of business.  The assumed objective, thus, 
is to get away from traditional command-and-control regulation involving for instance 
prohibitions, because of their political and economic costs.16  The lack of feasible 
policy instruments for conditions of extremely weak cohesion is also due to the fact 
that prohibitions so they are chosen tend to focus on sale rather than purchase, 
because of easier monitoring and enforcement conditions.17  
                                                 
16 A policy instrument coming close to the characteristics of instruments under conditions of weak 
cohesion are household heating standards, however.  They involve a normative appeal and the absence 
of freedom to opt for or against their application in that the failure to comply with such standards can 
lead to fines or even the prohibition of given construction projects.  Furthermore, such standards tend 
to withdraw resources from consumers as they often prescribe the implementation of relatively more 
expensive measures.  Finally, standards lack the characteristic of proportionality.  However, such 
standards are mainly a means for the policy maker to improve the environmental implications of 
consumption rather than to enhance the role of the consumer in improving the environmental 
performance of business.  Consumption standards support the latter objective only to a very limited 
extent, as long as they leave consumers with some choice regarding method or provider of 
implementation of measures to comply with the standards. 
17
 Exceptions exist in cases in which the sale of specific products is allowed, but only to particular 
customers.  Even here, however, the regulations tend to identify the retailer rather than the consumer as 
the responsible party. 
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 In sum, instruments to enhance the role of consumers in improving the 
environmental performance of business can exhibit a range of characteristics.  The 
particular choice of instrument will depend on the condition of cohesion in the 
particular case.  Under conditions of strong cohesion, feasible policy instruments are 
provision of information or subsidies of environmentally superior consumption 
choices.  Under conditions of weak cohesion, eco-taxes or charges on 
environmentally inferior consumption choices are more likely. 
 
 
III. The Likelihood of Strong Cohesion in the Policy Maker-Consumer Network 
 Having determined that the relevant network can be characterized by strong to 
weak cohesion, the question naturally arises, where on the consumption plane 
illustrated in Figure 2 we find ourselves most of the time.  Are consumers generally in 
situations making them more or less inclined to make environmentally superior 
consumption choices?  In other words, in the current political economy, do 
environmentally superior consumption choices tend to be associated with higher, 
similar or lower costs than environmentally inferior ones, and do they satisfy 
consumer needs to a greater, similar, or lesser extent? The following discussion 
highlights the relative extent of needs satisfaction and costs generally associated with 
environmentally superior consumption choices.18 
To what extent can we expect the costs of environmentally superior products 
to be higher, similar, or lower to the individual consumer?  A priori, there is little 
reason to expect these costs to be lower.  In contrast, in most cases they will be 
similar at best, if not higher.  Environmentally superior goods are sometimes more 
expensive in terms of their monetary price, as the externalization of environmental 
impacts keeps the costs of environmentally inferior products low.  Furthermore, 
                                                 
18
 The following discussion also reveals most clearly that the differentiation between costs and needs 
that the paper makes is a false one.  After all, the foregone satisfaction of needs can be viewed as costs 
of a given consumption decision.  For illustrative purposes, however, the paper will continue to make 
this differentiation on the following basis.  The paper uses “needs” to identify what is necessary for 
humans to survive and be happy.  Costs arise from the use of resources in terms of money, satisfaction, 
and time associated with the satisfaction of needs.  Costs, thus, are relevant for the satisfaction of needs 
through additional consumption choices.  Money, time, and energy spent one consumption choice are 
not available for the next.  A lower satisfaction of needs, in contrast, is specific to the given 
consumption choice.  Choosing a good that provides less status, if status is what I desire, therefore, 
means a lower satisfaction of the need driving that consumption choice.  Ultimately, costs translate into 
a lower satisfaction of needs.  The important difference (in the context of this paper) is, however, that 
they do not result in a lower satisfaction of needs with respect to the given consumption choice. 
 14
environmentally superior consumption choices often incur costs in terms of less 
convenience, more time, and more physical effort.  These latter costs are a function of 
the higher energy intensity of environmentally inferior goods.  Moreover, 
environmentally superior consumption choices can carry costs in terms of time and 
effort even if the consumer intentionally pursues them.  Often, considerable time and 
effort are necessary to identify the environmental characteristics of products.   
The extent to which environmentally superior consumption choices add to or 
subtract from the satisfaction of consumer needs is a bit more complex.  In order to 
assess how environmentally superior consumption choices relate to the satisfaction of 
needs driving consumption decisions, we first have to identify what these needs are.  
Scholars have described various human needs.  Maslow’s (1954) hierarchy of needs, 
in which he differentiates between physiological needs, safety, belonging and love, 
esteem, cognitive needs, aesthetic needs, and self-actualization needs is well known.19  
More recently, Max-Neef (1992) has developed a taxonomy of nine human needs: 
subsistence, protection, affection, understanding, participation, leisure, creation, 
identity, freedom.20   The most basic needs driving consumption are the needs for food 
and shelter.  However, much of present day consumption in Western societies goes 
beyond the fulfillment of these basic needs.  Today, we consume goods to express 
status and identity, to fulfill our needs for belonging, love and esteem (as Maslow 
would say) or for affection, participation, and identity (in the terminology of Max-
Neef).21 
Environmentally superior consumption choices could add to the satisfaction of 
needs compared to environmentally inferior consumption choices in a variety of ways.  
In theory, environmentally superior consumption choices could satisfy the need for 
self-actualization (if environmental values rank high on the personal value scale), 
status and belonging (if environmental values rank high on the general societal value 
scale, or the value scale of a particular social network such as an environmental 
                                                 
19
 The hierarchical nature of these needs is controversial (Vlek et al. 1999).   
20
 The two lists of needs are not exclusionary, of course, but overlap.  In the following discussion, the 
paper will rather freely use the terminology of one or the other or both. 
21
 The question frequently arises, whether these needs are “real” or “artificially created.”  This 
dichotomy is false.  As scholars have shown all needs are to some extent real, and yet their existence is 
always influenced by socio-cultural conditions as well.  There seems to be at the very least a human 
predisposition (possibly derived from the human being an animal after all) to want to accumulate, and 
to derive pleasure from having new and “nice” things.  The extent, to which certain needs exist, 
however, is a function of the societal context, as is the predisposition to satisfy them through material 
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group), for leisure and aesthetic satisfaction (if a healthy and beautiful environment 
and activities in it are part of the value system), for physiological and subsistence 
needs (if environmental problems are a threat to one’s health), and even for 
participation (if environmental consumerism is perceived as a concerted action by a 
group of significant size).  As the “ifs” illustrate, the potential that making 
environmentally superior consumption choices allows consumers to increase the 
satisfaction of their needs depends, in practice, on one or more of the following 
conditions: 
1. Environmental and/or social values need to rank high vis-à-vis competing values 
on the personal value scale. 
2. Environmental and/or social values need to rank high vis-à-vis competing values 
on the societal value scale. 
3. Signifiers of non-environmental values ranked high on the societal value scale 
need to be associated with superior environmental characteristics. 
4. Consumers need to perceive environmental consumerism as a concerted action in 
which a significant number of individuals take part. 
5. Environmental characteristics and conditions need to be a threat to the consumer’s 
health and survival. 
 
Condition 1 highlights that the ranking of values determines the extent to 
which environmentally superior consumption choices can contribute to the 
satisfaction of the need for self-actualization, for instance.  If environmental 
responsibility ranks high on the personal value scale, purchases of environmentally 
superior goods will allow consumers to satisfy their needs for self-esteem and self-
actualization.  Likewise, if social responsibility ranks high on the personal value 
scale, the individual will be more willing to forego potential private benefits of 
environmentally inferior consumption choices for the social benefits of 
environmentally superior ones. 
Condition 2 illustrates the same principle for societal needs, such as the needs 
for status, belonging, or esteem by others.  If being environmentally responsible ranks 
high on the societal value scale or the value scale of a relevant social group, 
environmentally superior consumption choices will contribute to the satisfaction of 
                                                                                                                                            
consumption when other means are available.  Finally, satisfiers of needs are to a large extent socially 
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the above needs.  If, however, other values such as “being successful” as indicated by 
wealth rank higher in society, consumers are less likely to choose goods on the basis 
of their environmental characteristics when trying to satisfy status.22   
Societal value scales can lower or even negate the potential contribution to the 
satisfaction of needs environmentally superior consumption choices can make on the 
basis of personal value scales.  After all, much of today’s consumption is competitive 
and socially driven.23  Veblen already identified the phenomena of conspicuous 
consumption and competitive display.  Other scholars have similarly highlighted the 
relative nature of needs, the concepts of social emulation and positional goods.  
Supportive of these theoretical insights are more recent empirical findings 
highlighting that relative rather than absolute income is the main determinant of self-
evaluated welfare (Durning 1992, Schor 1998). Consumption is about comparisons 
and hierarchies.  Consumption is about ‘keeping up with the Joneses’ (if not keeping 
ahead of them), or as Juliet Schor (1998) suggests today’s ‘keeping up with 
FRIENDS.’24  As long as individuals pursue competitive consumption, they have 
substantial disincentives to downshift individually, even if environmental 
responsibility ranks high on their personal value scale.25  
                                                                                                                                            
constructed. 
22Of course, different scales exist for different groups in society as well as different signifiers.  In some 
groups, one can gain status by being different than the “masses.” The purchase of energy from 
renewable resources at a premium can become a sign for being part of the “intellectual elite,” for 
instance. 
23
 It is not only consumption that is intended to provide status and esteem that is competitive and a 
cause of constant pressure though.  Even consumption intended to satisfy the need for belonging and to 
express identity often, though to a lesser extent, suffers from this pressure.  After all, in-groups in 
Western society are often defined by wearing certain clothes, or owning certain identifiers.  Thus, 
expressing belonging to an in-group, which is achieved through the exclusion of the out-group, is 
inherently relational and competitive as well. The increased need for belonging caused by the growing 
social fluctuations in society, then, supports consumption intended to keep up with … or be as good 
as…as well. 
24
 As Schor (1998) points out, the tendency of today’s consumers to compare with characters on TV or 
with colleagues (and bosses) at work has even increased the necessary consumption activities in pursuit 
of status, as individuals tend to compare themselves with people in other income groups. 
25
 This is a collective action problem, of course.  The best way to avoid the race to the top in gas 
guzzling or other consequences of conspicuous consumption would be for society to downshift 
collectively.  Furthermore, the predominance of societal values over personal values should not be seen 
too deterministically.  As the voluntary simplicity movement shows, increasing numbers of individuals 
decide to leave the game.  But they pay the “social costs” of doing so.  The latter might seem non-
existent to a voluntary down-shifter or actually be positive, and therefore one might think this whole 
discussion to be futile.  The difficulties with individual exits from the competition for status and esteem 
driven as it is in our societies by material possessions, however, become much more obvious when 
considered with respect to children.  Which parents can easily accept difficulties their children might 
face with respect to their social ‘acceptance’, however superficially the criteria for the latter are 
defined? 
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 Thus, competitive consumption and the question of the ranking of societal 
values highlight that environmentally superior consumption choices can subtract from 
the satisfaction of needs rather than contribute to them.  This is the case, for instance, 
if signifiers of desirable values are associated with negative environmental 
consequences.  An example of such a situation is that ‘large, fast, powerful, and 
automated’ goods in our society are frequently associated with status.  Shifting to 
environmentally superior consumption choices that involve smaller, slower, less 
powerful, and less automated goods thus can subtract from the ability of a given 
consumption choice to satisfy certain needs. 
Condition 3 emphasizes that environmentally superior consumption choices 
can be the result of consumers trying to satisfy needs such as status even if 
environmental values do not rank high on the societal value scale.  This is the case if a 
signifier of the satisfier of a given need happens to have superior environmental 
characteristics.  Thus, solar-powered equipment, for instance, might contribute to 
satisfy the need for status, because its high price and sophisticated technology signal 
wealth and therefore “success.”  
Condition 4 captures the potential of environmental consumerism to satisfy the 
need for participation.  By definition, participation means that the individual is taking 
part in some kind of group activity.  Thus, the likelihood that others will equally allow 
environmental characteristics to influence consumption choices becomes important.   
Finally, condition 5 illustrates the ability of environmentally superior 
consumption choices to contribute to the satisfaction of physiological needs.  This 
condition also highlights the collective action problems associated with environmental 
consumerism, as the individual consumer is generally aware that her individual 
consumption choices make little difference in terms of overall environmental 
quality.26  These collective action problems apply in particular to environmental 
                                                 
26
 Here, the collective action problems of the institutional set-up come to play.  In the market place, 
consumers act as millions of individual voices.  The transaction costs associated with trying to get 
consumers to act collectively are extremely high.  The costs of this effort are likely to outweigh the 
benefits for even the most environmentally concerned consumers.  Individual environmental 
consumerism, therefore, has to either ignore the lack of individual influence or trust that other 
consumers independently will act in a similar fashion.  An additional problem arises, since these 
collective action problems do not exist in a context that provides the institutional set-up allowing their 
easy resolution.  The benefit of repetition or tit-for-tat, for instance, do not work, since the number of 
small actions by millions of players separated across space and time does not allow for monitoring and 
enforcement.  As Reichart (1998) points out, the pay-off structure, consequently, does not change from 
one play prisoner’s dilemma to iterated games.  In consequence, environmental consumerism is a 
paradise for free-riders. 
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consumer activism, i.e. the use of environmentally superior consumption choices to 
make a political statement, since the individual consumer knows that by herself she 
has little impact on the environmental performance of business.  Only if a substantial 
number of consumers act in a similar manner will the market send a clear signal to 
business that environmentally superior performance will be rewarded.27 
Unfortunately, most societies today have value structures that do not rank 
environmental values sufficiently high compared to values such as success, fashion, 
comfort.  For the most part, status, for instance, is conferred by goods that are new, 
expensive, exclusive, fashionable, and/or technologically sophisticated rather than by 
environmentally superior goods.  As pointed out above, in a minority of cases, 
environmental characteristics may converge with aspects satisfying other needs.  Such 
dynamics are noticeable with respect to environmental brand names or fancy stores 
with environmental claims, such as Patagonia or Natural Wonders.  Being an out-
doors person has become fashionable, and a sign of status and success.  After all, you 
need to have the “right” equipment.  This trend, however, supports rather than 
undermines the claim that environmental aspects still play a very limited role in 
satisfying the need for status or esteem, or even self-actualization.  Often, the 
environmentally desirable characteristics of these goods are a function of marketing 
rather than reality, and frequently have no relationship or rather a negative 
relationship with being environmentally conscious. 
In sum, superior environmental consumption choices often are associated with 
higher costs, rarely with lower ones.  On the other side, such choices have the 
potential to contribute to the satisfaction of consumer needs.  This potential is limited 
though.  Environmentally superior consumption choices are generally not seen as 
important enough for immediate survival concerns, nor able to provide status.  For 
some consumers, environmentally conscious consumption does help to create and 
express identity and fulfill the need of self-actualization.  For some consumers in 
respective communities or under conditions of concerted action, environmental 
consumerism may satisfy needs for belonging and participation.   
Yet, the potential contribution to the satisfaction of needs by these factors is 
limited, and will only increase the likelihood of consumers making environmentally 
superior consumption choices, if the costs of such choices are the same or only 
                                                 
27
 The focus of this paper is on consumption by private individuals.  Therefore, the situations in which 
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slightly higher.  Furthermore, environmentally superior consumption choices also 
have the potential to be associated with lower levels of need satisfaction, as other 
values and competitive consumption can be more important than environmental 
characteristics.  This analysis suggests that most consumption decisions are located in 
the center and left side of the consumption plane.  The cohesion between policy 




 This paper has assessed the characteristics of policy instruments likely to be 
chosen in the policy process if the policy maker wanted to enhance the influence of 
consumers on the greening of business.  Using the policy instrument model, the paper 
determined these instrument characteristics of the basis of the network characteristics.  
For policy directed at consumers, the results indicate that the policy instruments likely 
to be chosen will range from those characterized by a lack of a normative appeal, 
provision of resources, and choice to opt for or against application of policy 
instrument for conditions of strong cohesion, to the presence of a normative appeal, 
withdrawal of resources, and a very limited choice to opt for or against the application 
of the policy instrument for conditions of weak cohesion.  The paper demonstrated 
that the provision of information to consumers fits these characteristics of policy 
instruments likely to be chosen under conditions of strong cohesion, while 
prohibitions fit the characteristics of policy instruments likely to be chosen under 
conditions of weak cohesion.  Assessing the extent to which environmentally superior 
consumption choices are likely to satisfy consumer needs compared to 
environmentally inferior ones, and the likely cost differential between these two 
choices, the paper argued that conditions of weak cohesion are likely to be more 
frequent in the policy network than conditions of strong cohesion. Future research 
needs to test this argument against empirical evidence. 
For a complete analysis, the policy maker – business dimension of the network 
needs to be investigated in a similar manner, of course. Intuition suggests that it is 
likely to be characterized by higher levels of interconnectedness, with cohesion again 
ranging from high to low levels.  This is partly because the number of members of the 
                                                                                                                                            
one company can have a significant voice in the market due to its purchasing power are ignored. 
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target group business – as large as it is – is smaller than the number of consumers.  
More importantly, industry is generally better organized and represented by 
associations in interaction with government.  Also, such interaction takes place on a 
quite regular basis for a diverse range of policy issues and objective anyway.  
Cohesion between policy maker and business with respect to policy goals is likely to 
range from relatively weak cohesion to somewhat high levels.  In general, it can be 
expected that business does not want to give anybody more influence on business 
practices and procedures than necessary.  However, one could argue that if such an 
outside influence is necessary, business would be likely to prefer such influence by 
consumers rather than regulators.  At the same time, business is the less likely to be 
inclined to giving consumers the ability to “vote” on environmental business practice 
the more vulnerable it feels.28  The following figure illustrates this relationship: 
(P erceived) E nvironm ental







This is just a preliminary discussion based on an intuitive assessment of the 
policy network characteristics in the interaction between policy makers and business, 
however.  Further research will have to conduct such an investigation in more depth 
and juxtapose its findings with those from the consumer focused inquiry presented 
here.  On the basis of the common space of probably policy instruments, we will then 
be able to move ahead in the discussion of the potential of environmental 
consumerism to contribute to an environmental transition in the business community. 
                                                 
28
 Thus, the worst environmental performers, the biggest (i.e. most visible) or those in “direct” contact 
with the consumer (i.e. producers of consumer goods) as well as those sectors or companies facing high 
implementation costs would be the most likely to oppose such a policy. 
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 Even though policy content was not the focus of this paper, the above analysis 
also reveals the range of potential strategies for policy makers to foster environmental 
consumerism.  Most fundamentally, policy makers have to increase the potential 
contribution of environmentally superior consumption choices to the satisfaction of 
consumer needs, and/or lower the costs of such consumption choices.  Increasing 
needs satisfaction can be achieved through providing more information on the 
environmental characteristics of products, for instance, so that consumers know when 
they have made an environmentally superior consumption choice.  Needs satisfaction 
can also be improved through the raising of environmental values on the societal 
value scale or the organization of concerted efforts to green consumption.  Relative 
costs of environmentally superior consumption can be lowered through forcing 
business to better internalize environmental impacts, but also by reducing the 
collective action problems arising in association with environmental consumerism.  
 While the potential for environmental consumerism identified in this paper 
might be disappointing overall (weak cohesion predominates), differences between 
societies can be noticed.  This should not come as a surprise since the above 
discussion of needs and costs reveals that the potential for environmental 
consumerism depends to a large extent on societal conditions and structures.  The 
ranking of values, for instance, has differed in societies across the globe and across 
time (although increasingly a convergence towards materialistic values appears to 
take place).  Moreover, signifiers of given values are social constructs.  Societal 
structures and conditions influence the extent to which we experience certain needs 
and our predisposition to satisfy them through material consumption.  Even the 
monetary price of a good is a social construct.  Furthermore, societies differ in their 
ability to overcome collective action problems.  As a consequence, different societies 
are located in different areas on the consumption plane.  The Netherlands and the 
Scandinavian countries, for instance, are likely to find a higher likelihood of 
consumers making environmentally superior consumption choices.   
 The societal basis of the potential for environmental consumerism also 
suggests that policy makers can attempt to shift a policy situation from one of weak 
cohesion to one of strong cohesion.  Be reducing the societal causes of collective 
action problems associated with environmental consumerism, governments can 
increase cohesion.  Such strategies often require changes in social values or structures, 
which are difficult but not impossible to achieve.  The effect would be politically 
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desirable in so far as it would involve less need for a more interventionist strategy by 
government and more reliance on providing consumers with the resources required to 
allow them to make the desired choice. 
 A change in the societal causes of competitive consumption, for instance, has 
the potential to reduce the collective action problems associated with environmental 
consumerism.  Similarly, it would be possible to change the attributes identifying 
satisfiers of certain needs.  What if, for instance, the most fuel efficient rather than the 
fastest car provided status?  Such changes would dramatically improve the potential 
for environmental consumerism.  Finally, a shift from weak to strong cohesion would 
be assisted by an improvement in the ability of society to overcome collective action 
problems resulting from increased trust, cohesion, and better communication.  Such a 
strategy can be pursued through attempts at better social interaction, integration, and 
participation.  Again, these changes are difficult to achieve and take time.  Given the 
potential impact and the political necessities and benefits, however, efforts, in this 
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